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Richard J. Ward, Ph.D.
This article summarizes and analyzes the views of select leaders in business, labor,
banking, the government, and academia with regard to the constraints, obstacles, and
recommendations to achieve economic growth in Massachusetts. The role of the state
government in addressing these issues receives special attention. Access to capital and
technical assistance had been regarded by many as the key constraint, particularly dur-
ing the recession of the early 1990s. The author analyzes inconvenient government sys-
tems, bottlenecks, and bureaucracy as throttling the flow of capital to small-business
entrepreneurs. The analysis concludes, however, that unless the state cum federal gov-
ernment finds ways to improve the macroeconomic environment, the incentives to invest,
expand, and venture will not prove adequate in comparison with the risks. Among other
questions, the article asks, In the absence ofdynamic and pervasive state policies and
programs to improve the state and regional macroeconomy, can the private sector alone
stop the investment drain and bring back full employment to Massachusetts and New
England?
In
the face of poorly performing national and state economies, business access to capi-
tal and technical assistance is a critical area of concern. The number of bank failures
in recent years and overall vulnerability of the banking system in many states, exacer-
bated by the sharp drop in value of the extensive real estate assets held by banks, com-
bined with the aftermath of the national savings and loan crisis, forced banks to tighten
credit, call loans, and reject potentially creditworthy business loans. The result was the
so-called capital crunch. In Massachusetts, the president of the Boston-based Federal
Reserve Bank, along with many CEOs of Massachusetts banks, also blames Congress,
which pressed regulatory agencies (Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve System) — hence bank regulators — to
pursue the practice of forcing all New England banks to cut back on loans to creditwor-
thy borrowers.
Despite these official acknowledgments of the squeeze on loanable funds available to
business, some bank CEOs, while sharply criticizing the role of insensitive and rigid
out-of-state regulators in stiffening loan/asset ratios and collateral requirements, still
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maintain that their institutions have adequate liquidity (low loan/asset ratios), but that
the real problem is one of severely limited volume of financially viable loan projects
from the private sector.
In this context, the commonwealth's Office of Economic Affairs, in cooperation with
the University of Massachusetts, sponsored regional conferences to engage represent-
atives of local, regional, and state agencies and private-sector financial, industrial/com-
mercial leaders, investors, and marketing specialists in the topic "Ensuring Access
to Capital and Technical Assistance."
The conclusions and recommendations derived from several topical conferences
around the state provided inputs to the state's strategic economic development plan for
the future. The focus of concern for the business community, and in terms of the eco-
nomic progress for the state as a whole, was primarily on what role state agencies or
public-purpose institutions generally might play in stimulating the state economy and,
in one specific conference, in filling the gaps in access to capital and technical assis-
tance for the state's business community. This assessment summarizes the views of the
business and political representatives, as well as the one expressed by specialists in
some of the contemporary literature of reports with respect to the difficulties perceived
in accessing capital and technical assistance, recommends a role for the state and its
agencies in improving access, and finally, addresses the issue of the role of the state in
promoting an economic climate in which both financial institutions and private-sector
entrepreneurs can operate more profitably and comfortably with each other.
Critique of the Current Development Environment
The Massachusetts business community, particularly small-business entrepreneurs, ven-
ture capitalists, and potential business and financial investors in new or expand-
ing enterprise, has been highly critical of various banking practices. It has alleged that
banking practices of late have contributed to the following perceptions:
1. The role of regulators in clamping down on the banks after the horse got out of the
barn has been negative. The banks could least afford the stringent requirements during
recession, regarding what they were allowed to accept as collateral. Local bankers knew
the character and expertise of their clients and should have been allowed to make their
own judgments as to the creditworthiness of those clients. A period of house cleaning
has dominated the financial institutions, and internal problems, reorganizations, and per-
sonnel shifts put a halt for a time to most small-business lending.
2. During the recent recession, banks lost their appetite for tax-exempts, found public-
fund deposits dried up, and feared loaning to business. They called in good loans
to meet new loan/asset standards, even rejecting sound collateral and good risks. In a
number of instances, regulators downgraded or rejected firm receivables, land, and other
loan collateral, placing constraints on business opportunity and growth.
3. Working capital is the most critical need for small business. Even as owners have sold
their homes to provide such capital, participants felt that banks have not been forth-
coming. Lack of such capital forces smaller companies to reject profitable bids on pro-
jects, turning away business. This is perceived to show both a lack of creativity and a
lack of commitment to the business environment on the part of bankers.
4. Large banks in particular turned away from smaller, more costly loans. There is
a need for loans from $10,000 to $50,000 or even $150,000, but the large banks shun
these smaller loans as not being worth their time and expense. The minimum amount
banks would like to loan is $250,000, but they would prefer and seek to negotiate
loans of more than $1 million; that is the lament of small-business people who require
less capital.
5. The desperation for smaller-business borrowers has been heightened by the decline in
the value, hence equity, in their own homes, as well as decline in other sources of
public or private venture capital. In this climate, small-business owners have been bur-
dened with high-cost "loan shark" credit or rescued by prominent and sympathetic
local businessmen, who provided credit from their own company resources on conces-
sionary terms. Banks, which need more flexibility in the requirements they set for small
business, must provide more asset-based lending and accept receivables as well as the
reputation and known character of borrowers against good-risk loans.
6. Banks have failed to provide adequate technical assistance services in preparing loan
applications or improving business plans and financial statements. They lack out-
reach and guidance in their approach to loaning to small entrepreneurs. More mentoring
and follow-up with business borrowers is needed, more visiting places of business and
acting as genuine partners in promoting the success of their borrowers.
7. Technical assistance may well be widely available through incubators, small-business
development centers, or other public agencies, but it is not readily transmitted to
those who need it. The many state quasi-publics and local community development cor-
porations (CDCs) and municipal or other community development agencies may be
there, but small-business owners seeking such help find it difficult to connect meaning-
fully and cost-effectively with that technical assistance. Often, small operations go
bankrupt for lack of know-how in rescuing their companies or see their product or mar-
keting ideas die for want of knowledge about accessing the expertise.
8. Some entrepreneurs acknowledge that capital can be acquired, but stress the time-
consuming tenacity necessary, in the nonpromotional or nonforthcoming climate
of the financial community, for small-business owners to get the capital they need.
9. Bank participants declared their commitment to the lending process and stressed the
constraints under which they have been operating, but also pointed to the lack of
professionalism in loan applications, business plans, balance sheets, and sometimes
expertise, of prospective borrowers. It is not cost effective for them to provide all the
technical help that business borrowers need, suggesting that such assistance must
come from other, probably public sources. Others recommended that more mentoring
be provided, not only from banks but from mature companies — to their smaller suppli-
ers, for example — and from numerous public and quasi-public institutions at the
municipal, regional, and state levels.
10. Venture capitalists are critical of the withdrawal of banks from cooperating with
them in filling the gaps between the equity capital they provide and the full financial
needs of new, promising ventures. A study reported that of 848 banks surveyed, only six
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reported any interest in lending to high-technology firms.2 This inhibits the role of ven-
ture capitalists.
The Role of the State in Promoting Development and Capital
Direct Role
State governments must be aware that when businesses within their borders realize
lower returns on capital relative to alternative returns for banks and venture capitalists,
capital seeks higher returns in out-of-state investment. States should assist in offsetting
this differential by making available to business — small business in particular—
through a variety of public and private institutions, including banks, more liberal access
to working and equity capital. However possible, the state should galvanize these or-
ganizations to facilitate loans and technical assistance to business. For example, Massa-
chusetts, like most states, has a long list of quasi-public institutions that provide
developmental assistance.3
States should be more forthcoming in making vast pension fund resources available
for venture capital through these agencies and in partnership with existing private
venture capital firms, while guaranteeing protection to pensioners. For instance, the
Massachusetts treasurer announced a program designed to utilize such funds for
affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families. A small percentage of state
pension funds could pump $200 million into assisting expansion and new ventures
in business, with Michigan and Pennsylvania serving as models.
Michigan allocated 5 percent of its $6 billion public pension fund in partnership with
private venture capital firms. The Michigan Treasury Department identified poten-
tial start-up companies with promise and committed $300 million to venture seed capi-
tal toward assisting the development of new companies. Similarly, the Ben Franklin
Partnership Fund of Pennsylvania provides challenge grants or seed money — $5,000 to
$100,000— for research and development, advanced technology, and start-up com-
panies, grants of up to $35,000 to small companies for new product or process develop-
ment, and seed venture capital funds for working capital and technical assistance for
incubator companies.4
States could channel some of these funds through the quasis to local banks, incuba-
tors, or community economic development offices, enabling them to provide capi-
tal and technical assistance to small businesses in their areas. Such funds could also be
used to buttress (ensure) collateral support for small-business loans, for example,
guarantees against firm receivables, through local banks.
State agencies or quasis should be prime facilitators in providing technical assistance
support at local levels, through local incubators, assisted by Small Business Admin-
istration bodies, since banks seem to be unable to aid in loan or business plan prepara-
tions or in identifying gaps in small-business expertise needed to render business viable.
Provide grace periods on capital gains taxes during start-up of small businesses and
other forms of tax relief during development stages, such as relief on workmen's
compensation, unemployment insurance, medical costs, and other costs of doing busi-
ness, where safe and sound state criteria can be met.
Compare commonwealth tax-exempt bond programs with those of other states for
effectiveness and improvement. For example, New Jersey has a tax-exempt bond
program (private activity bonds) providing low-interest loans of up to $10 million to
manufacturers and nonprofits for funding fixed assets, working capital, and loan
guarantees of conventional loans up to $1.5 million. New Jersey also provides working
capital loans — a revolving line of credit of up to S250.000 per export contract —
to promote export marketing.
States can effect reductions in long delays in handling business loan or other assis-
tance proposals, as well as in payment of their own bills to small businesses.
Actions through some state agencies and quasis can allegedly take months — far too
long to accommodate short time lines and working capital constraints of small-business
owners.
Grant more protection for providers of capital to guarantee safe exit of investors from
their commitments with close to expected returns. Streamline approvals and
turn a more empathetic system toward the service of suppliers of capital. Current regu-
lations inhibit safe return to local venture capital funds, owing in part to the drain of
local funds to capital cities and even out-of-state banking institutions. Remote trans-
action modes put local venture capitalists in vulnerable positions.
Link tax (reduce bank tax to corporate rate) or other relief measures for banks to
increase loanable funds and establish a guarantor program for small business or sound
start-ups (don't expect banks to provide equity; they are moneylenders).
More forceful use of link deposits (state bank deposits) to encourage banks holding
such deposits to offer loans for developmental purposes. States could set up perfor-
mance measures by which to judge the status of particular banks with respect to the
development impact of bank activity. For example, Illinois, through its link de-
posits, encourages minority business loans; California presses energy-conservation
loans; Ohio links its public deposits to institutions inclined to consider loans to small
business favorably.
A persistent and pervasive need, as indicated by Massachusetts conference partici-
pants, was for simplification and localization of all state and federal services.
Small-business owners, in particular, direct their strongest criticism to the absence
of one-stop shopping at the local level for their capital and technical service needs.
The services of state agencies and quasis, as well as loan services, tend to be Boston-
based and so diversified as to confound their efforts to gain sympathetic support
for their proposals, projects, capital, and technical assistance. There is a critical need
for the state to move its agency and quasi representatives out to the local communi-
ties through local bodies such as small-business development centers and other commu-
nity development organizations or local banks, so that business professionals can gain
the information they need locally and from one source. Massachusetts has responded
effectively to this recommendation by localizing some of its services to small business,
as discussed below.
Indirect Role
Assist banks to localize regulatory function of federal agencies; it has not helped local
banks to have "inexperienced and insensitive" regulators and examiners reviewing
their portfolios and bank practices. Massachusetts banks were reviewed by regulators
from Iowa! "Local." in this case, does not meant from Boston, but agents closer to the
regions who understand the areas* special needs, business, and banking practices and
tend to grant local CEOs more discretionary management of their credit systems.
The cost of doing business in Massachusetts remains unfavorable in the eyes of busi-
ness; the state could continue to press through legislative action or moral suasion meas-
ures that will reduce costs, that is, workmen's compensation, insurance costs, utility,
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energy costs, disincentive taxes, while providing tax relief or incentives for investment
to produce real growth in the economic base of the state. As to the tax burden, Robert
Tannenwald has indicated in his studies that of all of these, only Massachusetts taxes are
not out of line with its competitor states. 5
Urge the banking system to be more aggressive in carrying out the Community Re-
investment Act (CRA), as applied to business. Many banks still hold back. Federal
funds can help. For example, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) Community Development Block Grants are being used by cities to complement
and stimulate bank loans to small businesses in economically depressed areas. This in-
cludes technical assistance subsidies, direct loans, and loan guarantees. Matching funds
from banks are being used for microenterprise loan pools managed by CDCs. HUD also
provides, through private contractors, training, technical assistance, and business devel-
opment activities with a goal of requiring bank involvement. 6 New federally urged geo-
coding of small-business lending is there to assist the process. 7
In a review of ten banks in southeastern Massachusetts, for example, examiners rated
three outstanding and seven satisfactory (reported at length in the New Bedford Standard
Times, July 26, 1992). However, not all area business community personnel would agree
with all these ratings. The state has an economic (and political) stake in the rating of
these performances and should play a proactive role in mobilizing bank activity under
the CRA rules in local banks around the state.
Tax increment financing (TIF) is proposed by some Massachusetts industry groups as
a means of bringing private-sector needs and the necessity for more jobs and taxes
together through public-private partnerships. TIF permits the amortization of revenue
bonds issued by the municipality to fund development paid for by taxes generated
from the project. Forty-one states already have this legislation, but Massachusetts is not
one of them. 8
State agencies could more aggressively assist local institutions and businesses with
knowledge and technical assistance in obtaining federal grants, loans and account-
ing, bonding assistance, export marketing, legal advice, and special expertise needs.
It was anecdotally said that since localized services are readily available for welfare
recipients, why can't they be for business?
An example of federal, state, and private-sector cooperative efforts at development is
the New York/New Jersey Regional Alliance for Small Businesses. This combines
technical assistance inputs from senior officers of private-sector firms with direct loans
and loan guarantees from government sources to complement and encourage loans
(debt) provided by cooperating banks. Cities help by pledging funds from HUD Com-
munity Block grants. 9
Catalyze private-sector suppliers, especially those in economically depressed regions,
by providing incentives for business to supply infrastructure needs like parking
garages, industrial park construction, public works commitments on buildings, roads,
and other infrastructure, as well as provision of office materials and supplies for
public offices and functions. The state voucher system could be expanded to channel
this type of business to depressed area suppliers. For example, to the extent feasible,
the state bodies highly concentrated in Boston could direct more of their supply orders
to firms in other economically depressed localities in Massachusetts. Combining this
with large corporations' additional mentoring of their small suppliers in times of distress
could sustain many companies during periods of deep recession.
Reach out to county, municipal, and local government bodies to help remedy and
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reduce costs of complying with regulations, codes, zoning factors, permit systems,
fees, licensing requirements, and other obstacles that inhibit doing business in their
respective areas.
Make a more significant commitment to higher education in the state, which ranks
among the lowest in the country in support of its public system. The quality of the
workforce, skills needed, and research results available for business development is
directly affected by the quality of the graduates of the public system. This quality has
been deteriorating in recent years and state support is critical to turning it around.
In addition to general support for quality faculty, services, and research efforts, the
state could initiate industry-oriented industrial parks, incubator-type facilities,
health service and health research projects, or centers on or near university campuses.
As one source puts it, "States with significant university R&D venture capital and
highly skilled labor have the most potential for implementing a successful competitive
strategy based on entrepreneurial new firms." 10A number of campuses have exten-
sive unutilized acres for these purposes. Some university locations could also serve as
the one-stop coordination centers for area or regional businesses, under the aegis
of the state offices of economic development. One such office, formerly located in
Boston, was officially opened by the commonwealth in July 1994 on the campus
of the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. It has a budget of SI million and project-
ed staff of five to six professionals. Four other such regional offices are being
established by the state to bring information on access to capital, technical assistance,
and other matters relevant to business — for example, land availability, regulations,
export markets, and so forth — closer to the source of the need.
Many models or prototypes at universities around the country could provide the
information leading to such mutually beneficial activity between the needs of business
and the research potential of higher education. The Research Triangle near the
University of North Carolina, the industrial park at Syracuse University, and many
others could be replicated in a large number of states.
Once this positive business environment has been put in place with the help of the
state, based on a proeconomic development structure of taxation, state and local
agency and quasi-publics* support of business, there could follow an active effort to
disseminate far and wide that affirmative image as the reason companies should
locate in a particular state. Until the positive business climate measures are put in
place, however, that invitation will not be very persuasive.
States should avoid duplication of agencies and personnel. It was perceived in
Massachusetts that no new agencies or bureaucratic infrastructure are needed to carry
out the above improvements in the business environment; the state can utilize existing
institutions. In a sense, the current system of service to business is both distant and
choked up. It has been likened to the man in the hospital bed. gasping for breath, trying
to speak, his eyes wide. His visitor leans over to listen better, only to hear a barely
audible whisper: "You're standing on the oxygen hose!*'
The economic plan for the state should project to a strategy for implementation at the
regional and local levels by empowering local institutions and especially local com-
munity leaders and people at that level, not as directives from the state. The state should
steer but not row the boat. A state plan without a localized implementation strategy is
guaranteed to fail. Models for such implementation abound in states around the country.
Pennsylvania. Michigan, New Jersey, Minnesota, North Carolina, and others provide
examples of successful implementation and empowerment of the private sector through
11
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state guidance. 11 A microcosmic model for such empowerment is Baltimore's Life
Sciences Vision, which mobilized the resources of the business community — develop-
ers, bankers, business leaders, and other interest groups — to produce a highly suc-
cessful business climate. 12
It is the localized focus and convenient availability and implementation of these
technical assistance measures, services, and information — hand holding, if you will —
and its link to more empathetic sources of capital that the business community sees
and feels acutely is part of the cure for this problem.
Obligations and Impacts of the State Role
Some private-sector leaders are concerned about the degree of involvement by state
government in directly affecting private-sector business or investment decisions.
Should the public sector be investing tax dollars to support private business? What
effect do state decisions have on assistance to the private business sector? Do they pro-
vide unfair competitive advantage to some, denying it to others? Does the state have
a mandate to take risks that should essentially be taken by the private sector? Tax-
payers consider technical assistance to private-sector companies a hidden cost of doing
business. Are they obligated to pay these costs when such public subsidies seem to
help certain eligible firms and not others?
The answers to these questions are that the state is obligated to provide services to
businesses that pay taxes. While its constitution precludes the state from investing di-
rectly in private enterprise, it can and should stimulate private-sector investment aggres-
sively through the medium of state agencies and quasi-public institutions. Moreover,
the state must recognize the economic, social, and political costs of failing to assist pri-
vate businesses, which generate the tax revenues to support myriad other necessary
services and the public infrastructure needed to support society. The following statement
concerning the state's role in acting to promote economic growth aptly summarizes the
views of many:
State government can be the major force that determines whether this growth is retarded or accel-
erated. The most effective way to accelerate the creation of jobs by the private sector is for the
state government to provide laws, infrastructure, and incentives and to assist in the financing to
aid that growth. State policies which facilitate and stimulate technology transfer from our world-
class universities, and commercialization by our businesses will absolutely foster industrial
growth and jobs creation. 13
State Role in Recession: Low-Confidence Environment
The greatest constraint on private investment and economic growth has been the recent
recession and the general deficiency in overall spending and demand for durable
products, nondurable products, and services. Repeated Federal Reserve reductions in
the interest rate have not turned pessimism into unalloyed optimism as far as Massachu-
setts workers and consumers are concerned. Some bankers have detected positive signs
in improvement of loan applications and the business climate. The Bank of Boston's $3
billion special loan fund for business reported receiving 3,000 loan applications, while
some financially untroubled local banks claim to have plenty of liquidity for loaning
and are seeing better business-loan prospects coming through their doors.
The mergers of New England banks in the past few years, and the mergers with
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national banks to come, will also have a dramatic impact on the availability of loan
funds for business, though not necessarily for small-business loans. Loaning will
become much more depersonalized as the sources of funds and approval become more
distant from localities. 14 It has also been said that the lack of geographical diversi-
fication has often proved fatal to banks. Said one source, "During the 1980s, nine of
the ten largest Texas banks failed because of concentrated exposure to their own state's
economy. In the late 1980s ten of the largest New England banks failed because of
concentrated exposure to their regions' economy." 15 Also, concentration of portfolios
on single-industry areas, for instance, real estate, produced disastrous results in
Massachusetts. Diversification geographically and by industry seems to be the way of
the future; in this way banks increase enormously their loaning capacity and ability
to accommodate the bad loans with more access to loans with favorable risks.
At the same time, with many new financial loaning institutions arriving on the
scene, brokerage houses, insurance companies, commercial finance/factoring firms,
leasing companies, suppliers, venture capitalists, and even giant retail chains,
which are allowed more flexibility in loan practices than banks — loans to small busi-
ness are likely to become less attractive to banks. This process could be accelerated
should the federal government secure the small-business loans of all these quasi-finan-
cial firms through the "Velda Sue" legislation (Venture Enhancement and Loan
Development Administration for Smaller Undercapitalized Enterprises). 16 These trends
could become confusing to small-business owners and aspirants; it will be essential for
the appropriate state agencies to be readily available to assist business borrowers in
ascertaining to which sources of capital small-business borrowers can best gain access.
Many states are still a long way from being out of the recession. For example, in the
fall of 1992, the Conference Board's Consumer Index had dipped to 61 percent
nationally, but by July 1994 had risen to 9 1 .6 percent; yet the Confidence Index for
New England in July 1994 was a low 57.5 percent. Based on 1985 = 100, it reflected the
uncertainty and even fear that pervades the general public in New England about the
direction of the economy and the security of their jobs. 17
This makes it difficult for business investors, banks, and other New England suppli-
ers of capital to feel comfortable with the prevailing risk environment. If people are
not buying, it is difficult to launch and promote incentives to invest that are inevitably
tied to forecasts of final product sales. Entrepreneurs do not want to borrow and
bankers resist lending, even at what seem to be highly favorable costs of capital, if the
expectation of survival, let alone profit, is in question.
Neither the federal nor state governments can ignore the insufficiency of demand
(markets) as a significant source of the jittery prospects for private-sector investment in
New England. At the height of the recession, close to 10 million people were unem-
ployed nationally. The numbers who left the workforce or were underemployed were
unaccounted for. The recession hit New England particularly hard, owing to the spill-
over effects of the national decline in manufacturing and the significant manufacturing
orientation of the region. 18 Even in 1994, Massachusetts manufacturing firms were
still downsizing or closing. With millions unemployed nationwide and continuing losses
of jobs in Massachusetts, state government may have to focus on measures to stimulate
demand before incentives for stimulating investment (hence supply of goods and ser-
vices) can become more effective.
Pertinent to the themes raised by area business leaders, one hundred leading econo-
mists, including six Nobel laureates, urged the federal government to spend $50
13
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billion a year on investment. This proposal was strongly supported by leading business
CEOs around the country. The president and CEO of Sematech, Inc., a semiconductor
firm, urged the federal government to invest in technology, research, and start-up pros-
pects; the president of Tenneco, Inc., urged federal use of the peace dividend from
defense savings to invest in infrastructure — airports, bridges, rail networks, education,
training for skilled jobs, and investment in new fields of technology that promise the
greatest growth; the CEO of Thermo Electron Corporation urged government to recog-
nize the value to the private sector of government investments in the aerospace and
defense industries, which paid great dividends in the fields of computers, energy, com-
mercial aviation, and the environment, and to switch these funds to investing in new
channels of private-sector research and technology development; prominent economists
urged utilization of the idle capacity of the many technology firms to carry out federally
funded research (formerly supplied by defense industries) for future growth. 19
The state role in raising consumer confidence and spending, hence demand, may also
have to include more direct measures by the state to invest in the following ways.
1
.
Seeking out every possible source of federal assistance applied to ongoing state pro-
grams in housing, enterprise zones, defense niches, HUD programs available to states,
highway funds, construction of federal buildings or facilities, and harbor development.
For example, speeding up already approved federal spending on the complex and occa-
sionally stalled Boston Harbor project, the new federal courthouse in Boston, federally
funded highway construction or improvements, the partially federally funded research-
oriented laboratories and planned technical center buildings at our state universities, the
numerous federally funded training programs, some already approved for Massachu-
setts, others needing to be sought after. The state's congressional delegation could be
more strongly pressed to identify all federal sources of funding for state programs and
activities. Massachusetts representatives are often preoccupied with issues, often inter-
national, which, while important in themselves, seem to have little to do with promoting
the economy of their home state.
2. The state government could be more aggressive in committing funds to desperately
needed infrastructural improvements of roads, bridges, transportation, health, and
other sector improvements that can be made now at lower costs than will be the case
when the economy — and prices — recover. For example, in fiscal 1993 the state of
Massa-chusetts made use of $1 billion in federal highway and construction funds and
expects to use about $700,000 million in federal aid for fiscal year 1994, much of it
for the new road and tunnel complex through Boston. The state government committed
over $100 million of the 1992 fiscal year surplus to accelerate spending on road and
bridge repair projects. More of this type of direct job and demand stimulation is neces-
sary and should have been aggressively implemented early in the recession. State eco-
nomic plans should not hesitate to recognize the inadequacy of monetary policy alone to
resolve the staggering economic performance that plagued the recovery in many states
and in the country at large.
All these endeavors are necessary; they are not and should not be simply make-work.
They represent refurbishing the seriously deteriorated infrastructure of facilities and
services in the state which, when carried out, contribute to more cost-effective function-
ing of the private sector. Such investment is still needed and still lagging in implemen-
tation.
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More directly to the issue of access to capital and technical assistance, these commit-
ments of federal and state funds will provide jobs, revive spending on goods and
services, generate taxable income to the benefit of the state budget, and by raising con-
fidence, spur both private investors and banks to cooperate in a climate of better
prospects for returns on investment for both borrower and lender. If the state economy
continues to bump along far below levels expected by the public, by bankers, and by
private investors, the issue of access to capital and technical assistance issue remains
moot.
The "capital crunch" or credit shortage evolved from the recession, which was char-
acterized by the sharp decline of durable and nondurable manufacturing in 1988, the
savings and loan debacle, and the attendant collapse of value in banks' real estate port-
folios. New England's manufacturing and its banks were hit particularly hard by
each of these. A by-product of this phenomenon was the widespread criticism, elab-
orated here, among area business leaders of the deleterious role they perceived the
banks and the state played in shutting off avenues to credit and technical assistance to
existing and prospective business borrowers.
While bankers acknowledged mistakes in handling the problem, they also suggested
that the soundness and qualifications of many loan applications and applicants, the
extreme uncertainty of projecting favorable returns on investment in the recession cli-
mate, plus the jittery pall cast over the banking system by the S&L crisis, produced
an atmosphere of intensified regulation — many said insensitively administered— by
national agencies and justifiable caution by bankers. Bankers continue to aver that
they have not been opposed to small-business loans and, in fact, insist that "80 percent
of the borrowers in any given bank portfolios are small customers."20 (Many of these,
however, include nonbusiness borrowers.) Business leaders also criticized the state gov-
ernment for not being more responsive to assisting small businesses to overcome the
credit crunch by promulgating both direct and indirect policies and practices to improve
the Massachusetts business environment.
This article elaborates a considerable number of direct actions the state could take
within its province, as well as indirect actions to promote a more favorable eco-
nomic climate, and various incentives that could reach out to regions and institutions
within the state that could assist small-business owners. Many business leaders feel
that the state should take an even more responsible role in improving the Massachusetts
economy so that the prospects of profitable investment will make it easier for pro-
viders of credit to respond to loan requests. A state with an anemic economy is in direr
need of economic recovery than of credit. The state, it is believed, cannot simply
wait for the federal government to bail out its economy; the state must seek and obtain
constructive federal aid and programs wherever possible to contribute to a more vi-
brant level of economic activity. The state's own plans and policies should intercede
dynamically to promote full employment evenly spread to cities, towns, and countryside
by stepping up its own budget allocations and facilitating access to information and
sources of funding for small-business borrowers.
Having elicited views from business leaders, the state and banks have demonstrated
some responsiveness to critiques by increasing access to pools of small-business loan
funds and establishing agencies that bring information and guidance to small businesses
in the localities where they operate.
The rapidly evolving trend toward mergers, consolidations, and geographic industry
diversification will undoubtedly strengthen and enhance banks' loaning capacity for
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both large- and small-business borrowers. Yet owing to the vast and still-growing loan-
ing capacity of new nonbank institutions, which are not bound by typical banking
regulations and boundaries, plus the willingness of the federal government to approve
legislation to secure nonbank loans and the trend toward nonlocal, depersonalized
network banking, the small borrower faces even more complexity and perhaps indiffer-
ence from the banking industry of the future. This is all the more reason for the
state to play a more active role in facilitating access to capital and technical assistance
for small business through localized agencies staffed to provide hands-on informa-
tion and guidance that lead entrepreneurs to the source or courses of capital and busi-
ness expertise relevant to each particular loan case and process. Massachusetts has
undertaken the establishment of one-stop advisory offices around the state and making
the numerous quasi-public agencies more approachable.
At the same time, given the continuing lag in the regional economy, with massive
layoffs by many large companies — Digital, AT&T, merging banks, defense-depen-
dent industries and bases — and the chronic levels of high unemployment in some New
England cities, 21 the state should continue to play an aggressive role in bringing
its economy back to a higher level of prosperity and employment so that entrepreneurs
can forecast more likelihood of profits in their business plans. This in turn will attract
lending institutions, including banks and venture capitalists, to provide the requisite
capital. The state has gradually stepped up its role in fostering economic activity by,
for instance, allocating highway funds to localities around Massachusetts and working
with educational institutions to promote federally funded regional training programs
and manufacturing partnerships. Banks, state governments, and increasingly, nonbank
financial institutions must be far more cooperative and proactive in meeting the needs of
businesses that seek to commence, to expand, to innovate, to contribute their entrepre-
neurial skills and the resultant job creation they can bring to society. Some real progress
is being made in response to frustrations and criticisms voiced by business leaders who
were in the throes of recession doldrums. The state government, including the legisla-
ture, received the message from the business community and has taken steps to meet at
least some of the demands of small business. 22
The banking community, for its part, is enthralled by its own consolidation and di-
versifying transformations, which may or may not produce a more abundant and
friendly credit environment. Yet especially in New England, and certainly in Massa-
chusetts, there is much more to be done to localize credit and technical guidance to
small businesses, to bring in the rapidly growing nonbanking financial institutions in
this process, and to stimulate the state economy vigorously to foster an economic envi-
ronment in which creditable investment and job seekers at all levels can gain their just
rewards. *•*
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